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There are more than 40,000 agricultural cooperatives (ACs) in Europe with 9 million farmer members and 
over 600,000 workers. Due to the democratic nature of the cooperative form, it is assumed ACs empower 
their members and allow small farmers to have a stronger voice in the supply chain. However, much of the 
academic literature on ACs focuses on the economic analysis of their performance, while hardly any 
research has been done on analysing the impact that policy, long supply chains and the internalisation of 
the food system have on members and labour dimensions. This paper contributes to covering this gap by 
analysing how ACs are being shaped and misshaped by the European farming policy context and the 
architecture of global food systems. Following Schneiberg’s thesis on social movements being a condition 
for processes of diffusion and mutualism, the paper reflects on critical issues in organisational studies 
related to ACs, the cooperative movement and sustainable food systems. Case studies from Spain and UK 
illustrate the Northern and Southern European perspective. The concept of deviant mainstreaming is applied 
to discuss how ACs are being co-opted and losing their transformative potential as a result of pressures to 
remain competitive, with effects on members, social justice and the environment. The findings suggest 
policy changes at the European Level and the increasing internationalisation of the food system is fuelling 
the amalgamation of ACs, which is threatening their local embeddedness, and creating organisational 
tensions between the local, co-operative space and the global, capitalist space. 
Key words: cooperatives; social movements; diffusion; farmer members; food sustainability; UK; Spain; 
farming policy; deviant mainstreaming; mutualism 
 
Introduction 
For decades, organisational studies scholars have been researching collectivist organisations, their potential 
to challenge existing capital-labour relations, as well as their effect on, and how they are affected by, 
political dimensions (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Schneiberg, 2013). However, despite their social and 
economic significance, cooperatives have received insufficient attention from critical management and 
organisation studies scholars, who by default take large for profit organisations as the unit of their analysis 
(Kokkinidis, 2014; Safri, 2015). This is even more so in the case of agricultural cooperatives (ACs), a type 
of organisation and subject of study clearly dominated by the economic discipline (Wilson and MacLean, 
2012). The economics literature has shown an interest in studying finance, governance, and board and 
investors’ control in ACs (Cook et al., 2004; Ortmann and King, 2007; Chaddad, 2009). Hardly any research 
has been done on analysing the impact that farming policy, long supply chains and the internalisation of the 
food system have on members, labour, food sustainability and political dimensions (Mooney et al., 1996; 
Stofferahn, 2010; Gray, 2014a; Ajates Gonzalez, 2018).  
 
Scholars studying alternative organizations including cooperatives normally place the focus on worker-
owned cooperatives, highlighting their potential for transforming labour relations, the economy and society 
more generally (Cheney et al., 2013; Böhm et al., 2014, Parker, 2017). Most worker cooperatives are 
embedded on social movement discourses and their local areas (Cheney et al., 2012; Böhm et al., 2014; 
Parker, 2017). What happens however when cooperative members do not share working time and spaces, 
and their focus on growth dramatically takes them away from their original localities? As presented in the 
paper, this is the current standard situation large agricultural cooperatives find themselves in.  
 
Despite the interest in worker cooperatives, food producer cooperatives account for a larger share of the 
cooperative economy (Wilson and MacLean, 2012). Agriculture is in fact the largest sector by annual 
cooperative turnover, with more than 39%, or €347 billion, of the total annual cooperative turnover in 
Europe, followed by retail with nearly 30%, or €264.38 billion (Cooperatives Europe, 2016). Cogeca, the 
European body representing ACs, has over 40,000 cooperatives on its books with a turnover of 
approximately €350 million (Cogeca, 2015). European ACs employ about 660,000 workers and have 9 
million farmer members (Tortia et al., 2013) supplying more than 50% of agricultural products and more 
than 60% of the collection, processing and marketing of agricultural products (Bijman et al. 2012).  
 
There is a huge diversity of in/formal, and non/legally incorporated cooperative initiatives, from informal 
buying groups (Kneafsey, 2015), Community Supported Agriculture (Böhm et al., 2014), to multi-
stakeholder cooperatives (Lund, 2012; Ajates Gonzalez, 2017). In this special issue, I have chosen to focus 
on conventional ACs with a single type of member i.e. farmers, to interrogate the general assumptions that 
the power of a large cooperative directly reflect the efficacy and increased freedom that individual farmer 
members have, and that ACs are by default, active and part of the wider cooperative movement. 
 
Cooperatives have to compete in capitalist relations that put pressure on their democratic values. These 
“dual realities” of cooperatives (Parker et al., 2014) reflect the imbalance between their internal principles 
and the external context in which they have to survive. In the case of ACs, the grounded and locally-
embedded food growing activity clashes with increasingly internationalised and competitive farming and 
food retail markets. This research considers the following questions: How do these contrasting dual realities 
of ACs play out in a global food system? What is the effect in AC members and labour relations when not 
only social and economic realities are at play, but also the reality of climate change? And more importantly, 
how has the adaptation to the global economic and policy frameworks in which they exist affected their 
transformation potential and connections with social movements? To answer these questions, the paper is 
structured as follows: after this first introduction to ACs and some statistics on their central role in European 
farming, the theoretical framework of the research is presented. Next, the methodology section offers a 
rationale of the choice of the two country studies, Spain and UK. Two case studies of ACs are then analysed, 
followed by a discussion of the findings and conclusions. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
While most of the academic literature dealing with ACs do so from an economic lens (Gray, 2014a), this 
paper provides a novel angle by framing its analysis from an organisational studies perspective. The 
research follows Schneiberg’s thesis on social movements being a condition for processes of diffusion and 
mutualism in order to consider on how critical issues in organisational studies related to ACs, the 
cooperative movement and sustainable food systems (Schneiberg, 2013). Diffusion refers to the spread of 
practices within a social system, including behaviours, strategies, beliefs, technologies, or organisational 
process, values and structures (Strang and Soule, 1998). Diffusion studies have historically investigated the 
introduction and adoption of an innovation (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2017). In this paper, diffusion is 
applied to the analysis of the spread of changing cooperatives practices in agricultural systems in the context 
of mutualism. Mutualism refers to an alternative form of economic organisation, namely common 
ownership of the means of production or shared resources (material or financial), with the aim of providing 
mutual benefit and risk protection to members (Birchall and Simmons, 2004). 
 
In his study of cooperatives across states and industries in the United States, Schneiberg found that anti-
corporate movements are political conditions that help inspire, sustain and realise organisational processes 
of change towards diffusion and mutualism. Cooperative innovations are commonly identified as threats 
by corporations and/or other elites, whose fierce reaction is to present a strong opposition to suppress them 
and maintain the status quo. At this point when innovations are contested, social and anti-capitalist 
movements serve as “political forces that magnify or “turn on” diffusion effects, enabling or accelerating 
the spread of controversial forms” (Schneiberg, 2013:655). When threatening forms are contested, 
institutional change will not result from conventional organisational processes of mutualism or diffusion 
alone; rather, Schneiberg argues, change will depend on the combination of these processes with sustained 
and effective mobilisation by movements for alternatives (Schneiberg, 2013:675). In this paper I apply this 
thesis to the perpetuation of certain cooperative practices in European farming. 
 
Cooperatives are four times more likely to be described as ‘fair’ and ‘honest’ compared to public limited 
companies (Wilson and MacLean, 2012; Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias, 2013). However, ACs offer a not 
so clear picture (Berthelot, 2012; Kontogeorgos et al., 2017). At first sight, ACs present quite radical and 
anti-capitalist features, including allowing members to make savings by collectively purchasing inputs and 
paying for expensive infrastructure individual farmers would not be able to afford, as well as accessing 
training and shared policy and agronomy advice (Bijman et al., 2012). Due to the democratic nature of the 
cooperative form, it is also assumed ACs empower their members and allow small farmers to be more vocal 
and have a stronger voice in the supply chain. Following Schneiberg’s thesis, ACs should have met 
substantial opposition from private agri-food interests, yet, current statistics show ACs are far from a fringe 
organisational model, but a dominant actor in European farming.   
 
It is important to take stock of what cooperative dynamics ACs are diffusing and legitimising. Another 
question that emerges is how ACs have managed to continue to grow in numbers and power when, in theory, 
they represent an alternative way of doing business in opposition to dominant capitalist models in global 
food and farming trade. This paper suggests ACs’ practices and modes of cooperation are not a 
straightforward reflection of an idealised cooperative discourse. A useful lens to study how elements of 
alterity can used by cooperatives to transform the wider neoliberal system while keeping afloat in it, is that 
put forward by Arthur and colleagues (2008) on deviant mainstreaming through internal dynamics that 
create autonomous transformative social spaces. This term captures the internal strategies of organisations 
trying to sustain a degree of alterity while remaining financially viable. To be successful while true to their 
values, organisations attempt to remain “deviant” and continue to enact a reflection of the prefigurative 
politics they would like to see in wider areas of society (Sutherland et al., 2014)  while surviving in the 
dominant capitalism system (Arthur et al., 2008).  
 
The authors coined the term complementary incremental radicalism  to weave together the process and 
outcome of organisations applying deviant mainstreaming; it refers to the organisations’ capacity to inspire 
others, resulting in more transformative spaces becoming “emancipated” and creating the conditions for 
being “more widely challenging of the processes of domination” (Arthur et al., 2008:31). By providing a 
visible alternative, they create the conditions for like-minded organisations to evolve and challenge the 
current status quo (Arthur et al., 2008). However, when the pressure to compete gradually erodes the deviant 
elements of ACs, they can enter a dynamic of mainstream diffusion, which involves standard diffusion 
processes that involve practices that are no longer deviant or transformative. 
 
These concepts can both explain counter cooperative-degeneration realities as well as degenerative ones in 
which ACs no longer resemble grassroots and transformative cooperatives (Gray, 2014b). As ACs become 
larger as a response to competition and to take advantage from economies of scale, governance and member 
participation become more complex (Pearson and Parker, 2016; Birchall, J., 2017; Nilsson, 2018). These 
tensions are also present in the constantly contested international policy boundaries and spaces created by 
the multilevel governance of the global food system. ACs have to navigate internally with members and 
externally with representative bodies a wide range of national, EU and international policies. It is important 
to analyse the impacts these tensions driving amalgamation and internationalisation are having in ACs and 





Rationale for the selection of the case studies 
 
Since the Common Market was created, a geographical pattern in the European AC sector has emerged: 
more consolidated single-sector ACs in Northern Europe (including some multinational cooperatives) in 
contrast to more locally-embedded and with a higher number of multi-sectorial cooperatives in the South 
(Bijman et al., 2012). However, concentration of power and market share of ACs is also common in  
Southern Europe, where although atomisation of the AC sector is widespread, a handful of large ACs 
account for most of the cooperative trade (Bijman et al., 2012). The overall trend seems to be for increasing 
concentration, with fewer but bigger cooperatives and a growing number of transnational ACs with 
members in more than one country (Bijman et al., 2012). To represent both the Northern and Southern 
European dynamics, Spain and UK were selected as country studies. Their rich historical and socio-
economic differences and some present policy similarities make these two country studies a thought-
provoking entry point to explore labour and organisational dynamics in ACs. First, it is revealing to consider 
the differences. 
 
The UK was the first country to undergo the Industrial Revolution, have formalised cooperatives, and a 
highly industrialised agricultural sector. The UK was the second country after Denmark to consolidate 
farming, and by the 1980s, the UK had the largest farms in Europe. However, agricultural cooperation 
developed less and more slowly than consumer and industrial cooperation. UK cooperativism flourished in 
retail, as the bulk of the working population was formed of industrial workers who had to buy their food 
and other goods. Peasants became factory workers and consumers. In Spain, however, the movement had 
more political weight owing to the still high proportion of the population living off agriculture at the time, 
and the spread of anarchist and communist ideas. In contrast to the UK, Spain was one of the last 17 
Eurozone members to industrialise agriculture (Simpson, 2005). More recent disparities in farmers’ needs 
for marketing during the second half of the 20th century were another factor affecting farmers’ incentives 
to cooperate. In the UK, a much bigger average farm size and better developed retail sector with a greater 
degree of vertical integration decreased UK farmers’ need to cooperate, unlike their Spanish counterparts, 
who had to find a way into the market for their products. The effects of multilevel governance manifested 
themselves during the paradigm shift that took place in both countries when they had to get their agricultural 
sectors ready to join the EC, replacing their mandatory bodies with voluntary organisations to comply with 
EU competition law. The changes were even more dramatic for Spain, where, after many decades of 
autarchy, the country opened its borders and swiftly became a key exporter to the European market. 
 
In the UK, there are 420 (down from 621 four years ago) ACs in the country (Co-operatives UK, 2019), 
providing approximately 8,000 jobs (Co-operatives UK, 2017). Vertical cooperation in the supply chain is 
prominent. In Spain there is a long cooperative tradition in this Mediterranean country, which has the second 
strongest cooperative economy in EU, accounting for 2.2% GVA/GDP and 4.3% of employment. Spain 
has 4,000 ACs providing approximately 100,000 jobs (OSCAE, 2015). 
 
These two countries also share some similarities in their approach to AC policies. Both countries have 
undergone relatively recent cooperative legislation changes: Spain introduced a new law to promote 
mergers and acquisitions in the AC sector in 2013 (MAGRAMA, 2013). In 2014, the Liberal Democrats 
and Conservative Coalition government in the UK approved the Co-operative and Community Benefit 
Societies Act 2014, bringing cooperatives on to the political agenda to combine 17 pieces of different 






Multi-level methodological approach 
 
The bulk of the literature on ACs focuses on the economic dimension of transaction costs due to democratic 
governance models of these organisations. For this reason, an existing economic-based methodology was 
not adequate for the purpose of this study. The research presented in this paper is interested in the labour, 
organisational, socio-economic and sustainability related conflicts and contradictions that large ACs are 
encountering, and how this is having an effect on their members, social justice in the food system and the 
environment. To cover these dimensions, a multilevel approach to data collection was followed: 
 
1 Macro level: national and European level (Phase 1), focused on national and EU policies relevant 
to cooperatives and food policy. This level related to the role public policy has in shaping ACs’ 
practices. Macro data included AC statistics from government, EU and industry reports, as well as 
academic literature and public policy documents. 
2 Meso level: organisational case study (Phase 2), focused on the cooperative organisation, including 
longitudinal data from their history and origins to nowadays, as well as current statistics about their 
members, operations and turnover. 
3 Micro level: Individual accounts of cooperative members’ experiences (Phase 3); this final level of 
analysis aimed to collect and analyse cooperative members’ points of view about the role of ACs 
and their reasons for joining; investigate the subjective views and experiences of members and 
policymakers regarding differences amongst ACs. 
 
In total, 41 interviews were conducted including both ACs’ members and other relevant actors. Although 
all were included in the analysis, not all are specifically referenced or quoted in the text. A smaller group 
of 12 interviewees familiar with the case studies provided their specific perspective on the ACs. The 
interviewees were selected from each of the following categories based on an advanced version of the food 
policy triangle (estate, industry and civil society) proposed by Lang et al. (2009): 
 
 1. Industry 
 1.1 Large cooperatives (included in the country top ten lists) 
 1.2 Alternative food system cooperatives 
 1.3 Industry representative bodies/unions 
 2. Government 
 3. Academics 
 4. Civil society 
 
For MVF, a long standing member, a policy maker, an official from a cooperative representative body, an 
academic and a farmers’ union representative were interviewed. For Anecoop, a policy maker, two 
members of staff, two NGOs members, an academic and a farmers’ union representative were interviewed. 
To take into account both the content and the context of documents, I followed Braun and Clarke’s six 
phases of Thematic Analysis (2006); the emerging themes are presented in the next section. Additionally, 
triangulation of data sources, data types and informants was used to support the case study research 
principle that calls for phenomena to be viewed and explored from multiple perspectives (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998). Triangulation dimensions included: a) data types: different data sources and informants 
were consulted; b) data collection methods: interviews, desktop research and fieldwork; c) cross-country 
research: by exploring the same research problem and questions in two very different countries, an extra 
layer of data triangulation was added by the cross-cultural dimension of this study, which also contributes 
to the depth and richness of the findings (Hantrais, 2014). 
 
Case studies 
UK Case Study: From Farmway to Mole Valley Farm 
Farmway was an agricultural merchant formed in 1964 from the amalgamation of three ACs, namely, 
Teesside Farmers, Northern Farmers and East Yorkshire Farmers. In its early days, Farmway had 
approximately 2,000 members, and it was the leading agricultural and rural retail business in the north of 
the UK, specialising in animal feed, the processing and dressing of cereal seeds, fertilisers, and also the 
drying, storage and marketing of grain. In 2013, Farmway was bought by Mole Valley Farmers (MVF). 
The acquisition of Farmway meant MVF expanded its geographical presence, and the AC now operates 
from Cornwall to the Scottish Borders. 
 
MVF was founded in 1960 by a small group of farmers around South Molton who were concerned by the 
discriminatory practices and the large margins being taken by many of their input suppliers. Today, MVF 
is the fourth largest farmer-controlled business in the UK by turnover and the top supply cooperative 
(Oxford Farming Conference, 2014) owned by more than 8,000 farmer shareholders (Co-operatives UK, 
2017). In contrast to Farmway, MVF decided to bring in a new customer base by going into retail and 
selling a wider offer of products, including horse-riding gear, clothes, pet food, shooting equipment and 
garden and homeware, to reach beyond farmers to a wider audience of non-members. 
 
MVF has ten Mole Valley Farmers branches and three Bridgman’s stores across the south west, 38 Mole 
Country Stores, two Cox & Robinson direct farm outlets in the south and east of England, and 11 
manufacturing sites across England and Scotland (MVF, 2016). MVF has a focus on precision technology 
and on continuing to grow and develop (MVF, 2016). MVF’s family of enterprises also includes: Molecare 
Veterinary Services, Renewables, Farm Buildings and Mole Valley Forage Service. In 2015 MVF’s 
accounts report, Farmway made a positive contribution to MVF’s financial results in 2014. However, as 
the report highlights, the underlying results fell short of the expectation of managing the transition of these 
investments into profitable growth-oriented contributors (MVF, 2015), highlighting their focus on growth. 
In the 2017/2018 season, MVF’s attempt to acquire Countrywide Farmers culminated in the Competition 




Spanish case study: Anecoop 
Anecoop, a second-degree AC with 70 associated cooperatives across Spain, is the largest AC exporter of 
citrus fruits in the world and the second largest wholesaler, exporting about 80–90% of its production, 
mainly to the EU (Anecoop, 2019). When asked how many different crops the AC commercialises, one of 
the representatives said, laughing, “I don’t know, I can’t remember, everything that grows on soil”, which 
is pretty much correct judging by the catalogue on their website: all sorts of fruits, vegetables and wine 
(Anecoop, 2019). 
 
Anecoop was founded in 1975 by a group of 31 citric cooperatives from Valencia to gain negotiating power 
with retailers, and to be able to deliver big contracts with other countries that no individual cooperative 
could access owing to geographical and size limitations (Planells Orti and Mir Piqueras, 2004). The 
cooperative exports its produce to 70 countries and was an early adopter of internationalisation strategies; 
its first subsidiary company to carry out marketing operations abroad was set up in 1978–9 in Perpignan, 
France. 
 
The 31 original cooperatives became 109 in 2004. By 2015, Anecoop had 71 cooperatives; some of the 
existing ACs merged into larger cooperatives; others were allowed to go out of business (Planells Orti and 
Mir Piqueras, 2004). Despite the reduction in its number of cooperative members, volume and trade have 
continued to grow. Their latest accounts (Anecoop, 2019) report a team of 72,670 people, of whom 25,803 
(down from 28,206 in 2015) are farmer members, 22,588 (up from 22,300 in 2015) are members in other 
types of service, and 24,279 (up from 19,687 in 2015) are workers. Members are required to trade a 
minimum of 40% of their produce with Anecoop, although many trade more than that figure. The 
destination of the remaining percentage is negotiated with the cooperative to avoid sending it to the same 
market or buyer. Anecoop defines its strategy as based on permanent adaptation and innovation, quality, 
efficiency and growth (Anecoop, 2019). 
 
The data presented in this paper focus on Anecoop in Almeria. This branch of Anecoop was chosen for its 
geographical location in one of the regions of Spain – Almeria – where farming is highly embedded in the 
intensive paradigm and global international markets. Almeria is an Andalusian province known for its miles 
and miles of plastic greenhouses along the coast. The explosion of greenhouses began in the 1960s. Before 
then, the coastal area in the southern part of Almeria did not have a significant pre-existing cooperative 
culture or significant commercial agricultural activity (Giagnocavo, 2012). During the 1960s and early 
1970s, underground water found under some 30,000 hectares gave the area the status of a designated zone 
of national interest; soon, Franco’s regime introduced wells and basic pumps in an attempt to increase 
agricultural production (Giagnocavo, 2012). The first greenhouse was built in 1961 and by 1976, 3,081 
hectares were covered in plastic; this area grew to 9,657 hectares by 1984 and doubled to 18,694 in 1999 
(Sánchez Escolano, 2013). The figures from 2015, reveal an ongoing expansion, with the area dedicated to 
intensive greenhouse cultivation reaching 29,596 hectares, it is one of the few human-made constructions, 
commonly known as the “sea of plastic”, visible from space (Europa Press, 2015). Another reason for 
selecting this case study is that Anecoop shares an experimental farm with the University of Almeria (by 
far the largest in Spain), where new trials are tested for the market in collaboration with multinational agri-
input companies and for international retailers (Anecoop 2013; Fundacion Finca Experimental, 2013). 
 
Findings 
Amalgamation and integration: The battle against middle ACs and effects on cooperative 
membership 
 
Farmers’ decision to legally incorporate or be part of informal models of agricultural cooperation is shaped, 
among other factors, by the policy context at the time. Owing to the complicated policy arena where 
domestic and international levels of food governance often clash (Lang et al., 2009), farmers have to 
negotiate CAP subsidies, competition law regulations and EU directives. The following quotes illustrate 
how they pursue of vertical growth has pushed both Farmway and Anecoop to follow similar strategies as 
private companies: 
Yep, they were just merging, they weren’t federating, they just merged together and largely that was because of 
the financial pressure on the small ones, you know, I know Farmway was formed because basically the three it 
was made up of couldn’t, just basically couldn’t survive, the financial pressure. (Farmway member) 
 
This quote highlights the issue of imposing the same performance indicators as in private profit making 
organisations. In the case of Anecoop, a couple of interviewees external to the AC mentioned in their 
interviews that the cooperative had been losing members recently. This was an interesting point not covered 
by the interviewees from Anecoop until they were directly asked about it. This was their answer: 
Well, the majority of members we have lost is because they haven’t integrated themselves, because there have 
been cooperatives that have absorbed and integrated each other and there are others, logically due to their 
dimension, that not having integrated themselves in first-degree structures have disappeared for lack of viability, 
but we are continuing to do more volume with fewer members. (Anecoop rep. 2) 
Interviewees from cooperative representative organisations pointed out that, although the EU is not able to 
dictate the legal form of farmer enterprises, it is actually, through subsidy signals, fuelling forms of 
cooperation that neglect the cooperative principles, either by focusing on capital, not members, or by 
providing funds to Producer Organisations (POs) and other looser cooperative forms (Bijman et al., 2012). 
In this sense, EU policies have cognitive effects on the strategies of societal actors and their incentives to 
mobilise and/or build coalitions and collaborate (Skogstad, 1998). Those effects also take place at the 
national level, through domestic policies and legislation. A high degree of polarisation in the AC sector is 
leaving behind small and medium ACs in favour of more financially competitive and larger ACs (Gray and 
Stevenson, 2008). In Spain, the government is actively promoting the mergers of uncompetitive medium-
sized cooperatives in order to improve the efficiency of the Spanish agricultural sector (and the efficient 
administration of subsidy payments). At the opposite end, large ACs are benefiting from subsidies and 
rewards when they increase their size.  
I have a very small spectrum, roughly 10 cooperatives: Anecoop, Conen, Guisona, Decoop, Baco, which are 
going to merge next week . . . ok, say 20. Then at the other end I have 4,000. This is really, really sad. Here I have 
2,000 that are garage cooperatives,9 subsistence ones, of “the virgin such and such” [. . .] and the ones in the 
middleeee, the ones in the middleeee [in an annoyed voice] are the ones I want to catch. (Spanish policy maker) 
Smaller cooperatives such as those you are telling me about [referring to small alternative multi-stakeholder 
cooperative models], fantastic, but with that model, 4,000 cannot survive. Those that already have that model, 
fantastic, we provide them with certain services, this is not an issue that worries us. Those at risk are those that 
are not big and are not small. Right now they don’t export but they are not able to sell all their production [. . .] 
we need to look at [those with] 500 members who are not ready to export and don’t know what to do with their 
product, they are under-selling it. But the other ones, fantastic, we are not aiming to make all of them like Anecoop 
[. . .] apart that not all consumers are willing to pay for organic production, and here in Spain even less, so they 
are compatible. (Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias rep.) 
We have been trying for a long time that fewer ACs exist. For us it is not an achievement that there are 4,000 ACs 
. . . and if there were 5,000 it would be a disaster. What we are trying is to have 3,000, and if it is 2,000 better 
and 1,000 even better. (Cooperativas Agro-alimentarias rep.) 
The image of modernity for the sector is heading towards a future with fewer but larger ACs that can 
compete in the European and international markets and have enough power to negotiate conditions with 
large supermarkets. The following quote, however, reflects how embedded in the Spanish countryside the 
AC culture is, and how far from this top–down modern vision the sector actually is: 
It is not a problem of the cooperatives, it is a problem of the agrarian structure of Spain, very, very atomised. But 
it is not a problem of the cooperatives. Who hasn’t got a cooperativist granddad? Who hasn’t got a granddad 
that owns half a hectare in a village? What is that good for? NOTHING! And then you have the Anecoop model 
that is a monster. So then I have these and these other ones. And then I have these in the middle; my policies go 
to the ones in the middle. To the guy who’s got a cow in the garage, against him, I can’t do anything. To the big 
ones, in reality the policies should not bother them, they are going to serve them as small levers. But to those in 
the middle, I’m going to try, I shouldn’t say it but this is what it is, or get them out of the market so they stop 
bothering, or get them to integrate in stronger market strategies.  (Spanish policy maker) 
This comment reflects the retaliation effect predicted by Schneiberg that takes places when new or 
alternative organisations directly challenge elites and perceived as threats to market or political order. In 
these cases, corporations and other elites make use of different mechanisms, bad publicity or policies to 
suppress them (Schneiberg, 2013) and reduce their deviant characteristics (Arthur et al., 2008). Continuing 
on the topic of vertical expansion for competitiveness, for Anecoop, increasing size is a trend that the 
participants saw as ongoing, as the next quote suggests. Interviewees were asked: Where do you see 
Anecoop in 5 years’ time?  
“I: In 5 years . . . [thinking] I still won’t be retired . . . [laughs]. Let’s see, we have an integration project, that 
although it does have a certain parallelism with the cooperative law, what tries is, well, to increasingly integrate 
members in the structure of Anecoop, integrate the business management, so, where do we see it? I think it’s a 
simple survival logical way of looking at it, we have to continue growing, we have to continue growing. 
R: In trade or members? 
I: In everything. It would not worry us not to grow our members as long as our members’ dimension continued 
to grow. We would not mind in 5 years’ time to have instead of 72 cooperatives, have 50 but that those 50 made 
more volume than the 72. 
R: So it’s growth in terms of volume? 
I: Yes.” (Anecoop rep. 1)  
 
This extract reflects how the focus is placed on turnover growht rather than number of members and efforts 
to support local growers. In fact, the fewer but larger and more “competitive” members, the easier to agree 
on decisions and implement consistent standards across the board. Both ACs exemplify the increasing 
preference for growth through mergers and acquisitions, even if expected results are not always achieved 
(Encina Duval et al., 2011 and Meliá-Martí and Martínez, 2014). It seems ACs are no longer perceived by 
most as transformative, but as functional enterprises aligned with the aims and logistics of the productionist 
paradigm. In Farmway, for example, members seem to be perceiving their AC more as a shop than the 
farmer-led initiative that in its origins changed their families’ lives: 
Even then, the fact that it was a cooperative was weakening in the minds of its members. The fact that it was a 
good agricultural merchant was the driver really, rather than it was a cooperative. I have a rule that is the father, 
son and grandson rule. The father sets up the cooperative; the son keeps with it because he thinks he better keep 
father’s thing up, and the son marries in it but he starts to wander off a little bit, he doesn’t buy everything and 
his son basically packs everything up [. . .] The grandson, yes, the grandson . . . The real thing is the grandfather 
is the only one that experienced the problems that were there when there wasn’t a cooperative and therefore set 
the cooperative up and of course, the son might have done something to, you know, he might have listened to his 
father talking about and so on, but then the grandson, you know, things have moved on since then and go in a 
different way. (Farmway member) 
 
This quote highlights the lack of organisational memory of original struggles that motivated the creation of 
ACs. By not being part of the struggle and the negotiation of the rules and the culture of the AC, new 
members feel more like customers than owners if no education programme to keep that knowledge alive is 
introduced. The lived experience of setting up an AC seems to contribute to a deeper commitment to the 
transformational potential and roots of cooperatives and the links with the cooperative movement. 
 
 
Multilevel policy changes: Fostering competitive or cooperative labour relations in ACs?  
 
The introduction of multi-level European governance brought the re-emergence of agricultural cooperation 
in the UK (late 1960s) and Spain (mid 1980s) as a driver to resist competition from, and take advantage of 
the newly formed Common Market, strengthening export potential. EU policies have promoted and 
subsidised the formation of farmer-owned enterprises in member states; however, nowadays, the 
cooperative model is currently being superseded by a different model of cooperation that the EU is 
indirectly promoting through CAP subsidies that can gain acceptance in all member states (including new 
Eastern European countries that still have a distrust of the cooperative label owing to their communist 
regime history). This model is conveniently unregulated and increasingly liberalised, i.e. POs. A PO can 
either be legally incorporated as a cooperative or not; it is not a requirement to access subsidies (Bijman et 
al., 2012). The consistent contradictory message is that farmers should both compete and cooperate, now 
promoted and encapsulated in the term “co-opetition” (Galdeano-Gómez et al., 2015). 
 
Navigating the European policy arena to secure subsidies has also contributed to a growing lack of 
connections with the cooperative movement. This quote from a representative of the International Co-
operative Agricultural Organisation, a sector of the International Cooperative Alliance indicates this 
development: 
 
“In developed countries, ACs are very focussed on their business. I know they used to be very strong members of 
the ICA, but the ICA could not provide any profit for their business, so they withdrew all their members, so we 
don’t have many ACs in Europe […] Specially in the EU there is the CAP, so in the European regions, ACs are 
more concerned about the CAP and they want to be more involved in the lobbying and the decision making in the 
EU.” (ICAO rep) 
 
Beyond the CAP, the current discourse in most European countries is based on the perception of the state 
as a facilitator and the need to encourage farmers to become more entrepreneurial and business-like. Lockie 
(2009) has pointed out that this strategy is a means by which government can transfer food production 
responsibility from the state to farmers, also transferring accountability. If ACs are presented and used to 
concentrate farmers and produce, we lose sight of their radical social and political transformative potential. 
Dominant and instrumentalist images of ACs become diffused, with impacts on policy, and on the way the 
majority of farmers understand ACs and cooperation more generally. The concern that arises is that, as 
Jermier and Forbes have pointed out, once a dominant way of seeing becomes deeply engrained, it closes 
off alternative ways of seeing (Jermier, and Forbes, 2016). The diffusion of the capital-centred AC reduces 
the opportunities for incremental radicalism (Arthur et al., 2008). It is important, for this reason, to visualise 
alternative cooperative relations that are more conducive to creating sustainable relations amongst humans 
and the environment (Jermier, and Forbes, 2016). 
 
When operating in international markets, the traditional local embeddedness of ACs suddenly becomes an 
unnecessary constraint that interferes with mobility of capital (Gray, 2014b) captured by a new economic 
rationality (Polanyi, 1957). This mismatched existence between spaces comes at a cost. As a result of 
international operations, ACs expand geographically to access new markets and remain competitive, losing 
their local identity and uniqueness and adding “another layer of distance – physical distance – between 
members, member governance and cooperative decision-making” (Gray, 2014b:26) as well as consumers. 
  
If success metrics usually applied to private capitalist firms are imposed in ACs, the cooperative logic is 
lost, with vertical growth strategies and quantophrenic measures such as return on investment, becoming 
standard proxies for performance (Ajates Gonzalez, 2018). Safri (2015) has highlighted how these 
performance indicators are then distilled into models that are disseminated across public and private 
institutions, such as universities, consultancy firms and policy makers, perpetuating the same models and 
imposing the same performance indicators to organisations such as cooperatives, which originated to 
perform in alternative ways. A 2012 extensive European Commission study concluded that to compete in 
the farming markets, ACs’ strategies need to be similar to the ones the two case studies in this paper are 




Lock-in cooperation hindering sustainable practices: Industrial and long food supply chains are 
difficult to scape 
Interviewees reported that many farmers, while acknowledging they could not survive financially without 
being members of ACs, feel trapped in ACs that have a model of intensive agriculture for exports 
(McCarthy et al., 2017); this represents a social and political issue, not a technical one.  Many ACs seem 
to have become active agents and victims of short-term pressure, pushing their members to produce faster 
and more intensively. Uniform produce fit to endure long travel distances until the place of consumption 
fuel local disembeddedness, intensive methods and affect environmental sustainability.  
 
In their systemic review of the literature of the models of evaluation of the sustainability performance of 
agricultural cooperatives’ operations, Marcis and colleagues identified that, as with performance indicators, 
most sustainability evaluation models for cooperatives do not address sustainability in an integrated way, 
with a predominance of economic and social aspects and a neglect for environmental dimensions (Matthews 
et al., 2016; Marcis et al., 2018). The quest for more efficient, cost effective and faster processes displace 
efforts on bigger questions such as those related to biodiversity, depletion of natural resources and power 
imbalances. ACs, by fostering intensive farming and in some case supplying chemical inputs to members, 
are fuelling unsustainable productions methods that become difficult to escape once they are intrinsic to the 
ACs’ daily practices and operations. 
 
One of Anecoop interviewees reflected on how the adoption of more ecological methods (not always 
certified) in the region of Almeria was pretty much the only solution to improve working conditions and 
reduced the serious effects of pesticide exposure under plastic that members and their labourers were 
suffering from. However, the organic farming they converted to was not the transformative one envisioned 
by the early organic movement, but one highly embedded in international supply chains, involving intensive 
production, several harvests a year and monocultures (Goodman et al., 2011). More radical changes in their 
way of growing and selling their produce would be much more complex to implement, and thus the current 
greenhouses and cooperatives’ contracts keep them locked-in, perpetuating their embeddedness in 
industrial and global food systems: 
It is the way chosen to survive, economically embedded in the economic model of exports, that is why they are 
trapped, there is not an easy political exit against this option, it is not a technical question, it is not a technical 
question. If you design your farm, your life, your family, your mind for export activities, something has to happen 
to make you change, something serious, something big that makes you move to get out of there, if not, you don’t 
come out, because you’re designed for that, not just your farm. (Spanish academic) 
 
Several AC members spoke with sadness about the locked-in situation many farmers find themselves in. 
Some reported not being able to convert to organic because their ACs could not accommodate processing 
and marketing a very small percentage of its produce as organic. Others reported feeling trapped and 
unhappy with the way their ACs were running but acknowledged their farming livelihoods could not survive 
without them. These feelings of inevitability spread into issues of scale and barriers to creating alliances 
between farmers and consumers, as the following quote from an SAOS representative shows: 
(…) many farms in the UK in the last 50 years just got bigger and bigger, larger and larger farms and they have 
massive volumes of products to sell, so they have to be linked into supply chains that can take all that volume. So 
very often, they are linked in to supply chains that will be major food manufactures and major supermarkets so 
that they know they will be able to sell all their produce, so it’s scale, there is a mismatch of scale quite often 
between farmers, coops and local food requirements. (SAOS representative) 
 
This use of cooperatives as an economic and development policy tool is being imposed beyond EU borders 
on developing countries, reducing the space and ability of those being “developed”, being denied the 
opportunity to define their own understanding of cooperation in their own terms (Illich, 1976; Böhm et al., 
2010). This path-dependent development model of ACs and farming methods in developing countries, 
increases reliance on institutions and agricultural inputs from more “developed” countries (Li, 2007; Böhm 
et al., 2010; Rhodes, 2012). Links between colonialism and globalisation are a serious issue when top-down 
ACs are promoted by both the EU farming industry and governments in lower income countries and there 
have been reports of land grabbing and exploitation of workers by large European ACs, where farmers 
contributing produce to the AC are not offered the opportunity to become members (Berthelot, 2012). 
 
The importance of language: how “cooperative” is still a politically charged term 
 
Despite the cooperative model’s principle of independence from state and creed, governments of different 
ideologies across the world, have tried to promote, control and/or shape this organisational form to achieve 
their own agenda (Coates and Benn, 1976), a history that resonates with Morgan’s (2006) thesis of 
‘organizations as instruments of domination’. Factors such as land availability and ownership, and cultural 
dynamics, such as religion (Morales Gutierrez et al., 2005; Spear, 2010), shaped the development of ACs 
in Europe. Within the EU, ACs still mean different things to different countries: in the UK, the term 
“farmer-owned-business” is commonly preferred and fuelled by the vast array of legal forms that 
cooperatives can opt for under UK law; in fact, the word “cooperative” does not appear in many ACs’ 
names. Wilson and McLean found that many ACs try “not to look like co-ops as the co-operative identity 
is seen as ‘old-fashioned’” (Wilson and McLean, 2012:537). In Spain, the government is offering POs 
increasing support, and the term “associative entities” is becoming common in policy documents, a label 
more encompassing than ACs (CNC, 2012; MAGRAMA, 2013).  
 
Theories of the commons normally refer to the challenges of managing common-pool natural resources, 
such as rivers, fisheries, forests and shared irrigation systems (Ostrom, 1990). This model has also been 
applied to worker cooperatives as “labour commons” that generate commonwealth through their practices 
(Vieta, 2010). Further theorisation of this term could inform a process of repoliticisation  for ACs and their 
role in sustaining labour struggles in farming, a path already started by some multi-stakeholder 
cooperatives. The Open Coop model put forward by the P2P Foundation is an exciting model that calls for 
the creation of commons to be an intrinsic part of cooperatives (Ajates Gonzalez, 2017). There are hardly 
any workers’ cooperatives in agriculture compared to the huge number of marketing and supply ACs. In 
Spain, despite the dominant large ACs in top rankings, approximately 425 common-land cooperatives exist, 
where members co-own the land and cultivate it jointly (OSCAE, 2015). A member of a workers’ farming 
cooperative in the UK shared this comment on how workers cooperatives compare with conventional ACs: 
There are clearly many differences, lots of differences, but also many similarities. It means we have more in 
common with other worker cooperatives […]. But it’s different because we are working together and making a 
lot of decisions together on a day-to-day basis, whereas in that kind of more classic AC you’re coming together 
for buying or you’re coming together for selling or you’re sharing equipment but you’re not really sharing that 
day-to-day decision-making [. . .] it’s hard to compare, but definitely the workers’ cooperative element adds 
another layer of working together. (OrganicLea member) 
 
Not sharing the means of production could be the cause of a different cooperative reality in supply and 
marketing ACs. In contrast to workers’ cooperatives, AC members do not have to cooperate with each other 
daily; in fact, some authors argue they hardly ever have to cooperate, because farmers have delegated the 
act of cooperating to professional managers (Wilson and MacLean, 2012). The evidence presented suggests 
that the reasons for joining a workers’ cooperative can also be different from the outset from those that 
farmers might have for joining an agricultural cooperative; the latter appear to be more focussed on financial 
savings and the economic benefits of economies of scale, in line with what other studies have also found 
(see Wilson and MacLean, 2012). The data also indicates, especially in the case of MVF, that members 
have a passive rather than active relationship with their cooperatives, with many being distant from the 
governance of their cooperatives. In the case of supply cooperatives, farmers’ relationship with their AC 
fits more that of a consumer or buyer in a purchasing group. These findings are in line with those of from 
economic studies of ACs, which have found these cooperative organisations are developing similar 
managerial hierarchies to that of private companies (Iliopoulos and Valentinov, 2018), and losing social 




This research has made a contribution to the organisational studies literature by discussing the under-
researched topic of labour dimensions in the AC sector in Europe. It has provided evidence of how AC 
organisations are being shaped and misshaped by multilevel governance and the architecture of global food 
systems. Following Schneiberg’s thesis on movements as political conditions for diffusion to the study of 
ACs (2013). I have argued how, despite their strong presence in European farming, a focus on 
competitiveness and a detachment from the wider cooperative movement have weakened ACs’ 
transformative potential. The data discussed have showed how large ACs topping ranks, of which the case 
studies presented are an exemplar of, lack a social movement back up to serve as a political condition for 
the diffusion of contested alternatives. This skimming gradually moderates ACs’ deviant organisational and 
strategic characteristics, reducing in turn their capacity to foster incremental radicalism in the global food 
system (Arthur et al., 2008).  
 
In order to delve deeper into the diversity of European ACs and the north–south divide, two ACs, one from 
the UK, Farmway, and one from Spain, Anecoop, were presented as case studies. The cases reflected intense 
processes of consolidation in the AC sector through mergers and acquisitions. The historical role of ACs to 
exert pressure outwards towards input suppliers and buyers to protect members’ interests, has been 
redirected to inwards, with ACs pushing their own farmers to accept the pressures and practices of agri-
input companies, processors and retailers (Ajates Gonzalez, 2018). 
 
The research findings suggest cooperatives are just a vehicle to reach many diverse objectives. The case 
studies have shown how ACs can be used or can act as convenient shortcuts to concentrate produce and 
tap into large groups of farmers in order to: (1) sell them inputs more easily (useful for agri-industries); 
(2) buy their products (useful for large retailers); and (3) process subsidies or implement regulations 
(useful for policymakers and civil servants).  
The tensions between the local, co-operative space and the global, capitalist space are further constrained 
by policy changes driving amalgamation of ACs. At the same time, internationalised activities means 
ACs are losing their local embeddedness, with effects on members and food system sustainability. As a 
result, it seems that the dominant system has been able to co-opt the cooperative model and make use of 
its advantages for its own market objectives. This finding is in line with Schneiberg’s thesis (2013), in 
which cooperative innovations are expected to be identified as threats by the dominant players, which 
react by presenting a strong opposition with the aim of suppressing them in order to maintain the status 
quo and erode the deviant elements of ACs. The cases presented have entered a dynamic of mainstream 
diffusion, no longer deviant or transformative.  
Still, many questions emerge from this work. A constraint of this study is the limited number of AC 
members interviewed; a survey followed by a higher number of interviews with members of large ACs 
could be a next step to reach both a higher number of farmers and ACs in different countries and sectors. 
Future topics of research could include the nature of membership in large co-operatives, which has only 
started to be covered in this paper, and the shifting meanings of mutuality. Comparative research between 
worker cooperatives and agricultural cooperatives could highlight to what extent sharing means of 
production and cooperating on a daily basis contribute to sustained levels of deviant mainstreaming. 
At the same time, the paper has also acknowledged the wide diversity of ACs that exist across Europe. 
Many food and farming cooperatives, even if not large players, strive for food democracy and 
sovereignty, key issues in food policy (Lang, 2005) and can help recapture real long term economic 
success on a non-exploitative and co-operative basis (Pearson, 2012).  
To counter the dominant metaphor of ACs as organisations that are mainly used to generate efficiencies in 
costs, application of standards and concentration of produce, it is vital to celebrate and make visible the 
heterogeneity of actors, multiple forms of rationality and practice that takes place in food and farming 
cooperation (Ajates Gonzalez 2018). ACs have a potential and a role to maintain alive, formalise and 
legitimise the ongoing labour and class struggle and in rural areas, where variety of farmers and agricultural 
workers’ experiences create ongoing contestations in local dynamics and down the supply chain (Mooney, 
2004; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017). This potential to spark incremental radicalism (Arthur et al., 2008) 
in the food system and inspire others to follow through, can only be realised if ACs re-connect with the 
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